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Abstract 
Urban water supply in developing countries poses a growing challenge for the 
complexities of the processes involved, as well as for the extent of the potential 
consequences of the persistence of the ongoing problems. In the case of Mexico, during 
the last decades, a set of changes and adjustments in terms of the institutional 
environment can be identified, which however have led to the emergence of a set of 
varied institutional arrangements in the local level. In this paper, a research project is 
proposed. First, a brief hystorical analysis is proposed, in order to identify possible traces 
of the institutional environment’s evolution, in reference to the different responses 
implemented within the States and Municipalities. Secondly, a more detailed analysis is 
suggested, in order to explore the role of performance evaluation as a means for ensuring 
internal and external transaction efficacy, where the operator’s management performance 
as an agent should be assessed in terms of the effective, equitable and sustainable 
attainment of the system’s objectives; the conception and implementation of a strategic 
performance management tool is proposed, both as a governance enabling device and as a 
learning tool for the researcher and the organization. 
Keywords 
Management; new institutionalism; decision support systems; sustainable development; 
developing countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
Urban water provision poses a major challenge in developing countries, since a large part of the 
population lives in medium-sized and bigger cities, whose water sources are becoming each day 
more scarce and menaced by pollution and competition with other users. There is a need for 
building new infrastructure – mainly for waste water collection and treatment –as well as for 
substituting older installations and equipments; in general, investment costs and even operating 
ones are not sufficiently recovered and administrative practices don’t always lead the systems to 
a sustainable operation; the lack of both career stability and competitive remuneration prevents 
the consolidation of a strong work force in this sub-sector; organizational structures and 
regulations don’t always support good management practices; water users and citizen’s concerns 
are also usually disregarded, leading to vicious circles of distrust and lack of support and 
attention. Simultaneously, the lack of adequate practices for land use development, solid waste 
management and risk prevention, complicate the urban water system’s environment. In this 
context, facing the challenges introduced by the need for moving towards an integrated urban 
water management model, which should adequately incorporate sustainable development issues, 
would pass through the improvement of management practices, even for revising urban water 
governance structures. 
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The challenge of urban water supply in Mexico 
 
Mexico is a federal, representative and democratic republic, with elected authorities in the 
Federal Government, 31 State governments, the Capital city – Distrito Federal – and 2438 
Municipalities. By the Constitution, water belongs to the Nation and the federal authority – 
through the National Water Commission (CNA, for its Spanish acronym) – concentrates the 
most relevant jurisdiction attributions, both in water management and in water supply regulation, 
while State authorities show very different capacities, structures and scopes in this field. Since 
1983, the Municipalities are supposed to be primarily in charge of the operation and 
development of every water supply and sanitation system, in urban and rural settings – including 
the nearly 190 000 population centers or localidades, 98% of which have less of 100 people and 
are located in rural dispersed areas –, with the subsidiary help of State authorities, theoretically 
in exceptional cases. 
 
Presently, 550 cities house more than 15 thousand inhabitants each, accounting for 62.8% of 
total population in the country; amongst them, 123 cities have a population over 100 000 
inhabitants, where 11 cities house more than a million people (INEGI 2005). Institutional 
arrangements for urban water supply and sanitation are quite heterogeneous. Since the transferal 
of operating responsibilities to the municipal authorities, the possibility for the State authorities 
to take charge of the systems remained, when justified by the lack of local capacities, but in 
some states the process had different outcomes. Presently, in about two thirds of the 31 federated 
states it is the State authority that rules and manages urban water systems; in the other, these 
services have been transferred directly to the municipalities more than 10 years ago; some urban 
areas have inter-municipal utilities and in some other, state dependent public operators are in 
charge of local urban water systems; very few systems have been delegated to a private operator 
and even a mixed firm exists. Federal government, by means of the CNA, still keeps control of 
some relevant budgetary and normative levers, while State authorities strive for gaining wider 
normative, supporting or even operating capacities. 
 
Institutional diversity in urban water management in Mexico could be seen as the result of a 
series of successive implementation of policies facing a rapid urbanization process – Mexico’s 
population grew from less than 25 millions in 1950, of which only 47% lived in cities with more 
than 2500 inhabitants, to more than 103 millions in 2005, with 76.5% of urban population (CNA, 
2007b). Influence of different policy paradigms, remarkably those of “new public management” 
in late 80’s, introduced policies seeking to implement decentralization, private sector 
participation, market mechanisms, as well as better accountability and social participation 
mechanisms. The most important reform undertaken, the constitution of municipal operators 
structured as semi-independent public enterprises – with their own accounting, assets and 
governing bodies –, has shown very uneven results, while CNA has kept a double role, in one 
hand as a “counterpart” of Municipalities and States in setting up the “master plans” and co-
financing related investment actions, which were expected to improve water supply’s 
efficiencies and coverage, and in the other, as the regulatory agency in charge of inspecting 
users’ practices and enforcing law for water rights administration and water quality control, 
among many other functions. Attempts to implement private sector participation have failed, 
remaining very limited in number and scope and mainly being promoted for financing long-term 
supply and treatment facilities (Pineda-Pablos, 2002; Castro, 2007). 
 
In terms of results, even when urban water and wastewater collection coverage is rather high – 
over 95% for cities with more than 2500 inhabitants, while 94.7% for sewage connections–, less 
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than a half of the population has continuous supply (BM, 2006), while wastewater treatment 
accounts for only 36.1% of collected flows, with very variable efficiency levels (actually 
removing less than 24% of total DBO generated); besides, invoice collection is estimated around 
81% of total billed consumption and unaccounted-for water is calculated in 42%, which renders 
a global efficiency under 50% (CNA 2006, 2007a). Sustainable provision of water services is 
threatened simultaneously by the financial, administrative and technical weaknesses of municipal 
operators and by the rapid reduction of reliable water sources, the deterioration of watersheds – 
in 30 years, the number of overexploited aquifers has tripled, potentially affecting 60% of 
groundwater sources in the country, while 47.8% of surface waters are considered as polluted or 
heavily polluted in terms of their COD levels (CNA, 2007a) –, the growth in conflicts between 
users, the reduction of subsidies and the growing competition for financial resources. It is 
expected that, in the year 2030, 53% of the population will live in 35 cities with more than 50 
000 inhabitants, mostly concentrated in the central and northern parts of the country (CNA, 
2007a) – where sources are becoming scarcer and conflicts more frequent; in the future, more 
than 100 million people would be affected if the present condition persists in the urban water 
supply sector. The need for setting up a proper integrated urban management model seems to be 
a difficult task but also a potential tool for sorting out from this complex situation. 
 
One research question that could be posed is why, under similar institutional environments, so 
many different institutional arrangements have emerged throughout the country. In some states, 
as Guanajuato, water supply is under the jurisdiction of each of the 46 Municipalities; in some 
others, as Querétaro, the State authority operates water supply systems throughout its territory, 
with the exception of one city; in others, like Baja California, there is a State-dependent operator 
in charge of the city of Tijuana – one of the best managed water supply systems in Mexico – 
while in others, like Nuevo León, the inter-municipal operator of the capital metropolis, 
Monterrey, is growingly taking part in the development of services in other cities in the State, 
including rural ones. Talking about private sector participation, the failure of this policy – in 
terms of its objectives of attracting investment capitals, extending services to the poor and 
liberating public funds while improving efficiencies in concessioned systems (Castro, 2007) – 
could have been a matter of a failure from the part of regulating bodies, a consequence of the 
difficulties for implementing new tariff structures or of the paralysis facing the sharing of risks 
(Breuil & Nakhla, 2003), but a more detailed analysis could be worthy. Specifically, the very 
different nature of institutional environments from the countries whose models have inspired the 
private participation schemes from the 80’s, in terms of their stability and the relative simplicity 
of their operation should be analyzed – since those models aren’t probably well suited to face 
problems like urban development lawlessness or the need to build extensive infrastructure, 
circumstance which could perhaps explain the good performance of privatization schemes (such 
as in England) or leasing contracts (such as in France) in those settings. Disregarding the public 
or private nature of the capitals involved in the extension and the operation of urban water 
systems, it is true that municipal operators, in spite of the reforms implemented in the 90’s 
aiming to transform them into public enterprises, are now jammed in a system of overlapping 
relationships of normative, supporting, cooperative and subordinating nature dealing with its 
federal, state and local counterparts. As Breuil (2004) describes it, public urban water supply is 
characterized by the absence of a formal contractual framework and thus of specific objectives, 
where self-control predominates and a strong political interference remains in price setting. 
Moreover, if dissecting water supply and politics has been seen as naïve (Schwartz & Schouten, 
2007), due to “water sector realities” in developing countries, from the figures and perspectives 
presented, the need for finding alternative ways for improving governance structures and 
institutional settings seems well justified. 
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Understanding the origin and dynamics of the institutional diversity in the Mexican water sector, 
both from the national context and from the local specificities, in particular for trying to identify 
some clues or paths from the analysis of the institutional arrangements in place in different 
settings, seems to be instrumental for opening ways to the design of innovating public policies in 
this sector. By its own nature, as well as because of the long-term questions raised by the quest 
for integrated or sustainable management of urban systems, two kinds of questions can be posed. 
First: Is there a relationship between the evolution in the institutional environment, the 
governance structures and the systems’ capacity to ensure a sustainable provision of water 
services in the urban context? And second: Is there a place for strategy formulation and strategic 
management within such a complex setting as the one we have in developing countries? In other 
words, what have been the feasibility, the role and destiny of strategy formulation and 
implementation in this context? Would the implementation of a strategic performance 
management process help to improve learning about the issues linked to the transformation of a 
governance model in sake for improving the system’s sustainability? In this paper, a research 
proposal is outlined for addressing these issues. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS 
Rationale and proposed methodology 
The primary aim of this research is to analyze the relationship between governance structures 
and performance in the context of a set of Mexican urban water supply operators, specifically 
focusing on the role of information and strategic performance management processes and tools. 
In a first stage, a thorough revision of the origins and characteristics of a selected set of urban 
water supply governance structures within the country would be undertaken. Then, since urban 
water supply is a long term subject, the actual and potential role of strategic management 
processes – or, eventually, the absence or the obstacles for implementing such kind of processes 
– would be studied. In a second phase, the implementation of tools for strategic performance 
management – a strategic scorecard, dashboard or control panel, developed through a 
participatory and recursive process of selection of indicators, evaluation and feedback – is 
envisaged as a potential mean for exploring the main issues affecting governance in urban water 
supply, both from an environmental as from an internal institutional approach. 
 
New institutional economics is proposed as the basic theoretical framework for this research 
(Williamson, 1996; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Ménard, 2003), complemented with the 
exploration from a cognitive approach to contract theory (Girin, 1995) and strategic management 
(Bouvier, 2004) and from stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1985). A specific approach of 
intervention research is suggested, where the presence and eventually the implementation of 
management tools is considered as a structuring and learning device capable of revealing 
unattended knowledge about “organizational operation, the piloting of transformation and the 
exploration of new [courses of action]” (Moisdon, 1997; 2006). In this case, the eventual 
implementation of an adaptation of a Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) or tableau 
de bord kind of management tool is being considered a priori as a potential pivot for a second 
phase of the field exploration; a specific process for the implementation of a strategic 
performance management tool would be used to analyze the transit towards a different 
governance model, in which an adequate consideration of stakeholders’ criteria and priorities 
should be incorporated, as well as the proper sustainable development criteria. 
 
In terms of a definition of the problem, an adequate articulation between its components should 
be attained. First, departing from a historical and a field analysis from a neo-institutionalist 
approach, some hints and orientations about the relationship between governance structures, 
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institutional arrangements and environment should be obtained, from the exploration of how the 
different transaction classes identifiable within the Mexican water sector are translated into 
governance structures, partially as a response to the implementation of sector-wide policies, as 
well as specific to each local setting. Secondly, the actual and potential role of information 
sharing, performance assessment and strategic management would be explored more deeply in at 
least one case, taking into account the cognitive and relational aspects of the issue. A general 
model for setting up a strategic management tool would be proposed, with the triple objective of 
incorporating sustainable development and integrated management criteria, allowing 
stakeholders participation in the systems construction and operation, as well as considering a 
flexible form for elucidating preferences and aggregating performance indicators, according to 
the multi-user, multi-criteria nature of this kind of system. 
 
It most be pointed out that previous works have shown the potential of new institutional 
economics for the analysis of urban water supply’s issues, mainly around the evaluation of 
reforms where the collectivity has the choice (or has been given the choice because of the 
reforms) between public management and delegation to private operators (Breuil, 2004; 
Fauquert, 2007; Guérin-Schneider 2001; Ménard and Shirley 2001; Ménard and Saussier 2002). 
These are valuable sources for the construction of an analytical grid, without loosing sight of the 
more general intention of this project, in terms of the scope of institutional arrangements that are 
envisaged to be studied. 
Building an institutional analysis grid 
The construction of the analytical grid is in process to the date this proposal is being written. In 
general terms, new institutional economics would furnish a conceptual grid which should be 
useful to analyze, through a historical exploration as well as through an in-depth field analysis, 
the relationship between the changes in the institutional environment – mainly those related to 
the evolution in the resources related to urban water provision and the implementation of specific 
policies, projects, organizational structures and constraints –, and the local responses in form of 
specific institutional arrangements, from which a set of transaction and assets characteristics, as 
well as their contractual implications, would be proposed (Baudry, 1995). 
 
For characterizing the kinds of transaction present in urban water supply and sanitation, a model 
for identifying the nature of the agency relationships would be proposed from the cognitive 
approach of J. Girin (1995), in which each kind of mandate – whether it is clear or difficult to 
make explicit – and each kind of task – according to its inherent degree of difficulty – calls for a 
different interaction between the agent and the agency – that is, a different transaction kind – 
which implies different follow-up devices and different suitable indicators (Table 1). 
 
We propose to characterize as different transactions each of the main functions to be performed 
by the urban water operator as an agent, where the nature of the task and even the kind of 
mandate would vary according to the institutional environment and arrangements. That is, one 
specific function which would correspond to a clear mandate for performing a simple task in a 
specific institutional environment can turn into a confuse function (difficult to make explicit) or 
involve a more difficult task in another institutional environment or even in another moment in 
institutional environment’s or in the agency’s relationship evolution – perhaps because of the 
cognitive structure or the information imbalances between the parties, the complexity of 
information sharing procedures and decision making rules, the gap between present and required 
capacities and the nature of the assets involved in the performance of the task. 
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In terms of transaction costs economics, the kind of mandate and the nature of the task are 
related to the simultaneous presence of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior (since a 
complex task and a confuse mandate would perhaps leave more space to agents for getting 
informational rents), and thus, each urban water function could be related to different levels of 
transaction costs and, for each setting, indicate whether an institutional arrangement would leave 
more or less place for failures in the system’s governance. 
 
A very important requisite for performing this kind of exploration is to test a definition of 
specific agents, functions, means – conceived as the set of resources available to each agent to 
perform the required task – and communication channels for interacting with the principal. An 
agent transforms resources into service outputs while being subject to a set of constraints, and 
leading the organization to a different state of value as perceived by its stakeholders. Another 
fundamental dimension for the analysis is the extent to which reliable data will be available, in 
order to allow a numerical analysis of the transaction costs which should ideally lead to 
effectiveness and efficiency analyses, including the effects of the delays related to performing 
tasks of similar complexity under different institutional settings.  
 
TABLE 1: Relationship between kinds of mandate, difficulty of the tasks, transaction interactions and 
suitable numerical indicators. 
 
Kind of mandate 
Clear Confuse a 
Nature of task: Simple Complex Simple Complex 
Initial interaction Precise specification of mandate Vague declaration of mandate. 
Responsibility limitations. 















Final interaction Results evaluation Precise accounts and 
reports. 
Eventually, 










a. Difficult to be made explicit. 
Source:  adapted from Girin (1995). 
 
In principle, it seems to us that this kind of analysis would help explaining why some contractual 
models work right in stable environments linked to precise definitions of means and expected 
results, even when the tasks involved are complex, while in other settings they tend to fail or lead 
to institutional deadlocks. It seems worthy to undertake an exploration of the communication 
processes having place between citizens, urban water users, mediating parties, municipal 
authorities, the directive council, the operator’s management and even the State and Federal 
legislative and executive branches of government which take part in some of the core 
management processes for urban water services provision – such as tariff setting and approval, 
budget allocation, demand for information, legal inspection and evaluation activities. Moreover, 
it could be useful for exploring the cognitive issues linked to the principal-agent relationship and, 
instrumental for the purposes of this research, for assessing the potential role of information and 
management tools and systems within governance models, necessarily conceived as contingent 
to the local cognitive and institutional characteristics.  
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Strategic Management Tools and Governance 
As it was suggested before, the conception and implementation of a tool for piloting the strategic 
performance management of a urban water supply system is considered as a potential way for 
bringing out a deeper learning on the way the related management process are structured within 
the organization’s operation, on how the transformation takes place and even on how new 
emerging issues can be dealt with, within an intervention research model oriented to the 
revelation of unattended aspects of the processes under study, rather than trying to verify a 
specific hypothesis (Moisdon, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, from a previous exploration of these issues, it has become apparent that conceiving 
performance piloting tools could contribute to the construction of a consistent governance model, 
in terms of its capacity for reacting to external and internal constraints, “mobilizing a panel of 
tools belonging to three key dimensions: the contractual, the institutional and the social ones”, 
while satisfying the system’s overall objectives (Breuil, 2004, p. 272). From an initial 
exploration stage, setting up a tool similar to the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) 
would seem appropriate to take into account the objectives different from the value of the firm 
that can be suitable in the case of a water operator, being a monopoly which must fulfill several 
performance criteria under a set of constraints. For instance, facing the arguments of the 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), it has been proposed to utilize an “enlightened balanced 
scorecard” to bring the agent an aggregated measure of performance, so to allow him to better 
choose the appropriate levers for improving performance (Jensen, 2001).  Of course, the way the 
strategy is elicited for incorporating it to such a kind of a scorecard, the issues related to the 
aggregation of performance measures and stakeholders preferences’ elicitation processes, the 
inclusion of sustainable development objectives – perhaps even beyond the preferences of 
present stakeholders – are issues that must be explored, specially after a first field research stage 
will have been performed. Moreover, taking into account the usual effects of the implementation 
of any management system within an organization, even the professional and identity processes 
should be addressed and analyzed.  
A sustainable development framework 
In principle, a working definition for incorporating sustainable development to strategic 
management in urban water services can be that proposed by the ECLAC (1991, 24-25): 
“[Sustainable Development implies] a dynamic balance between all capital forms or assets that 
participate in the effort of economic and social development of the countries, in such a way that 
the resultant use rate of each capital form does not exceed its own reproduction rate [...] Among 
the most important capital forms, the following can be highlighted: the human capital (where 
people also represent the development subject), the natural capital, the institutional assets 
(decision systems), the cultural assets, the physical capital (infrastructure, machineries and 
equipment) and the financial capital”1. In spite of trying to analyze the consequences of the 
operator’s activities on a set of economic, social and natural environment indicators, we propose 
to explore the tracking of the state, pressures and dynamic response of these resources 
categories, as they appear to the operator’s as being available and behaving in their system’s 
environment and as they would be consumed or transformed within it; the rationale would be 
that, as long as the utility can dispose of these resources in a sustained way, while not 
contributing importantly to their imbalance for the rest of the organizations belonging to the 
same system’s environment, its chances to perform in a sustainable way will be greater. 
 
 
1 In (Sandoval & Palombo, 2007), the use of this definition is proposed as a reference for performing a self-
assessment exercise of a urban water supply system’s sustainability. 
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For the rest of the project, a fundamental orientation could emerge from this model, in terms that 
the agent would be expected to perform the set of tasks defining urban water services in a 
specific context – some of which would be likely to be expressed in precise terms, some of them 
not – making use of a set of resources and subject to the constraint of not depleting or 
increasing/restoring some of these related resources. In terms of the analysis of the consistency 
between means and expected results, this definition can furnish an analytic grid, useful for 
assessing the associated difficulty degree and, at the same time, since the fulfillment of the 
objectives of the system is related to the extent to which the agent satisfies the stakeholders’ 
expression of an aggregated “function”. 
 
In terms of the implementation of a scorecard or a dashboard, it can be noted that there have 
been prior attempts to use the Balanced Scorecard to incorporate the evaluation and alignment of 
social and environmental concerns to the long term strategic management of a firm (Figge et al., 
2002). Indeed, the “four perspectives” proposed in the Balanced Scorecard model can be 
identified with the set of sustainability resources from the ECLAC’s definition. The problem lies 
on the procedure for assessing whether the firm’s performance has effects on its economic, 
environmental and social value in a balanced way. Regarding the participatory nature of a shared 
construction of a strategy, a self-evident requirement if an alignment between the agency’s and 
the principal’s objectives is to be attained, it has also been proposed to explore different methods 
for incorporating tacit knowledge from expert workers into the strategy formulation to be 
integrated in the scorecard (Abernethy et al., 2005), which could also be useful to include the 
external stakeholders perceptions into the model. Anyway, the relevance and appropriateness of 
building and implementing such a model in the context of the proposed resarch remains to be 
tested and defined during the process of analysis. 
INITIAL INSIGHTS FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE RESEARCH FIELD  
The institutional environment 
At a first stage, some basic 
elements of the institutional 
environment in Mexico’s water 
supply sector should be 
identified. The field of research 
would consist, in an initial 
phase, of the analysis of the 
evolution of water supply 
institutional environment and the 
identification of the emergence 
of different institutional 
arrangements in some specific 
local settings. Figure 1 shows a 
graphic inter-linkage between 
the emergence of the different 
administrative public bodies 
which were expected to take 
charge of urban water 
infrastructure development, as 
long as urbanization and political plurality grew throughout the country, while different external 
frames of reference were also were exerting a strong influence in policy making, which was 
Figure 1 Institutional evolution in Mexican water supply 
sector (author’s construction based on Pineda-Pablos 
2002) 
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being mainly conceived and implemented from the federal offices in charge of the issue (Pineda-
Pablos, 2002). 
 
An emphasis should be put on analyzing the last 25 years, from the municipalization wave and 
the related public tax and expenditure reforms. The rationale and the policies implemented to 
create and promote the evolution of municipal operators built as public firms, with a 
participatory governing body and a supporting scheme of master plans and financing programs 
would be analyzed in terms of their impact on investment in the sector and the evolution of a set 
of different cities. Although there are no homogeneous and complete sources of information on 
the different public and private investment in urban water supply for that period (1983-1989), at 
least a set of general trends would be sought. For the last period, the adaptation of the chosen 
cities and States to the evolution in demographic variables, socio-political and financial 
environments, related to their outputs and performances, is expected to reveal some key 
processes regarding the role of the structuration of the relationships between collectivities and 
operators. A detailed exploration should be made in order to elucidate whether some public 
policies can be considered as institutions in terms of their stability, degree of abstraction and 
generality and their normative character; their implementation devices and processes should also 
be analyzed. 
 
A possible set for analyzing the proposed evolution would include: 
• Querétaro State, where state authority still operates water supply systems in every 
municipality but one; the capital city’s performance is amongst the best in the country. 
• Coahuila State, where there is a supporting state authority, as a mediator between federal and 
local authorities; the city of Saltillo has now a private participation scheme based on the 
constitution of a mixed enterprise with interesting outputs. 
• Morelos State, where a supporting state authority has recently been created 
• Aguascalientes State, whose capital was object of the first important integrated concession of 
water services to a local partner of Véolia 
• Quintana Roo State, where the state authority still controls municipal water supply, with the 
exception of Cancún, where there is a concession to a local partner of Ondeo. 
• Baja California State, where the city of Tijuana, operated by a state-dependant operator, is 
reputed to be the best managed water utility in Mexico. 
 
A detailed analysis in terms of the performance indicators available, the institutional 
characteristics and comparability criteria would help to approach this analysis with more 
pertinence and precision. 
 
After a first stage, where the evolution of public policies in terms of their institutional 
consequences and the emergence of local arrangements would be analyzed, in a second stage 
some elements would be sought to study which of these local responses have led to a more 
effective attainment of social goals. An identification of the core concepts for an institutional 
analysis would be instrumental, that is, the principal-agent relationship, the governance 
structures, institutions or micro institutions (Ménard, 2003), the rules and the implementation 
devices constituting the institutional environment. A selection of three representative cases – for 
instance, one where water supply would have been mantained under the centralized control of 
the State authority, another one where municipalities rule the services and a third one having a 
mixed structure – is envisaged to delimit the research’s scope. 
 
Inherent to the idea of exploring alternative governance structures in terms of their comparative 
effectivenes for attaining social goals, there is the idea of defining in a broader fashion a urban 
8th World Wide Workshop for Young Environmental Scientists WWW-YES-2008: Urban waters: resource 
or risks? 13-16 May 2008 
10 / 13 
                                                
water supply system’s objective structure, taking into account the expected outputs in terms of 
quality and reliability of services, but also its performance vis-à-vis sustainability issues, that is, 
the way in which the system affects the resources whose utilization right is exerted by the agent 
and the internal equilibria concerning the utilization and complementarity of those resources, 
based on the definition presented in the previous section. This formulation leads to the idea that 
the agent should need, in order to guide his decisions towards a better overall long-term 
integrated performance of the system, an aggregated way for evaluating the consequences of 
those decisions. The existence (or the absence) of information systems or procedures leading to 
this kind of integrated evaluation of performance is considered as a potential analytical pivot for 
exploring governance mechanisms, as they imply internal and external transactions and 
interactions with internal agents and with external stakeholders. Therefore, the implementation 
of a strategic management tool could serve as an auxiliary research learning device to explore 
and follow-up how the effectiveness of transactions could be improved in a specific case. The 
collaboration with a consulting firm to conceive and set up a model of Balanced Scorecard for 
water utilities is envisaged, in which consensual bottom-up evaluation of performance and 
specific performace criteria, related to water supply sustainability, would be sought2. 
EXPECTED RESULTS 
This research project could show different outputs: 
o It is expected to shed light on the origin of governance structures for urban water supply, 
whose diversity facing a similar policy context calls for an thoughtful exploration 
o A relationship between different local governance structures and performance, in terms of the 
transactional facilitation leading to effective, equitable and efficient results, in a sustainable 
fashion, would be sought 
o The role of performance monitoring in internal and external agency relationships would be 
explored, if possible undertaking a process of “governance engineering” by the conception 
and implementation of a strategic dashboard as a tool for revealing a deeper learning of the 
organizational implications of  performance steering in relation to effective governance. 
o Ultimately, a more general model for the analysis of governance structures in urban water 
supply and sanitation, even a specific proposal of a model linked to the implementation of a 
strategic management tool could be proposed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
New institutional economics, in one hand, seem to furnish a powerful analytic grid to explore 
whether some institutional arrangements show a greater effectiveness and, in that sense, if some 
kind of orientation in terms of public policy conception and implementation can be obtained. In 
the other hand, reflecting on the implications of embedding sustainable development issues in 
the definition of the overall objectives of a urban water supply system, thus constituting the 
broad “mandate” to the operator, conceived as the agent, leads us to the exploration of strategic 
performance management as a way to improving transactions effectiveness and, in principle, as a 
possible device for reaching a deeper learning on how agency relationships occur within the 
organization and in its interactions with the external stakeholders. Being at an initial stage, this 
research can still be better outlined, specially when fieldwork comes. 
 
Urban water supply in Mexico, for the challenges it poses to the Nation’s development, can help 
raising important questions about the ways public policies can favor institutional environments 
enabling more effective transactions towards the sustainable fulfillement of social goals. 
 
2 In González et al., 2006, a model proposed for a South American water operator is proposed. 
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Performing the proposed exploration can shed a light to overcome the complex problem of 
ensuring an efficient long-term provision of urban water services, which affects a very large part 
of the population of the country. 
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